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THE RELATION OF RIGHT TO LAW.*
This subject involves the two distinct branches of human
knowledge known as ethics and politics, and requires an examina-
nation of the nature of each as necessary to an understanding
of the relation of the one to the other. The theory to be
adopted as to this relation must be scientific;'it must be based
upon observation of historical facts and phenomena, which it
must satisfactorily explain. It must also be universal; it must
apply to the first law recognizable in human society, organized
politically, whatever may have been the form of the law or the
system of government; and it must be true of laws to-day,
and remain true throughout every form of law and of state
which the development of future ages may attain.
First let ps examine what is meant by right; it is an expres-
sion most frequently employed; whenever a question is being
debated in any realm of human knowledge or experience, this
word is generally used as referring to the standard of decision;
this is as true in physics or mathematics as in ethics or meta-
physics; and in'politics-in a discussion as to what the law
ought to be-the aim of each disputant is chiefly, if not solely,
to prove that he is right and his opponent wrong.
If we resolve this term into its content, as existing, perhaps
somewhat indefinitely, in the minds of those employing it, we
shall find that the mathematician and scientist use it to express
a harmony with established universal principles; so also does
the metaphysician in his realm, while the moralist and the
political disputant, if their ideas were sufficiently analyzed,
would be found aiming at the same effect, though less directly,
and with consequent increase of incertitude.
Confining our attention to the political disputant, we shall
find he uses right in the sense that material advantage to the
community will follow the adoption of the measure he advo-
cates, or he claims for it directly the moral approbation of the
people; and usually these two meanings coincide. It may seem,
superficially, as if there were no relation between these two
bases of argument, material advantage, and moral attitude;
but in reality the latter is only an effect of the former; for
people as a rule morally approve that which will result to the
material advantage of their community.
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Here we have crudely shadowed forth the fundamental
principle of ethics-the principle of utility. Utility, as applied
to a specific rule of action, means that the operation of such
rule will result in the increased happiness or welfare of the
society within which it is in force, or, what is the same in effect,
in a lessening of pains and detriments. It means, not merely
the happiness of a majority in that society, but chiefly the
welfare of the society itself, as an entity having a natural
organic existence, upon which the happiness and welfare of its
members depend. Those rules and actions accord with this
principle of utility which aid the society and its members in
the struggle for existence, bringing the society into harmony
with its conditions of existence, and decreasing its peril of and
required efforts against extinction.
In judging an act as to its moral character, we must view it
in its relation to the society in which it occurs, and limited to
the time of occurrence; we must place ourselves in the position
of an enlightened member of that society at that time, inde-
pendent of the dogmatic requirements of codes of action, espec-
ially those of other societies, or of that society at another
period.* Thus situated our judgment as to whether that act
is right or wrong must depend upon whether it is actually, on
the whole, beneficial or injurious to that society.
It is characteristic of human events that the effects of any
particular act are neither wholly beneficial, nor wholly detri-
mental; both good and evil are found to result, in proportions
varying, in different acts, from almost exclusive good to almost
exclusive evil, and passing through intermediate stages where
it is difficult to decide which is in excess. This is not so by
any universal law of necessity, any more than is the fact that
very few, if any, individuals are physically absolutely perfect
or absolutely imperfect. It is simply due to the conditions of
human existence, and can be controlled only in the degree in
which these conditions are subject to melioration.
We are herein concerned with rules of action, and the above
truth, being applicable to acts in general, must apply to those
performed in accordance with some rule. Rules in force in a
society, whether they are legal or only moral, whether evolved
consciously or sub-consciously, are productive of evil as well .as
good. The test as to whether a rule is right or wrong is: tak-
ing the excess of good over evil wrought by the rule, examine if
*Much erroneous criticism is due to the fact that the critic views the act as
if it were to concern his own society in his age.
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this is greater than the excess of good over evil which would
have resulted if the rule had not been introduced, or if some
other rule had been; if so, the rule is right; if not, it is either
indifferent or wrong, according as the same, or a greater excess
of good over evil would have resulted from its absence, or from
the introduction of some alternative rule. This test alone is
precise and accurate, but for simplicity a rule wjll herein gen-
erally be considered with regard merely to its own effects, ex-
cluding all reference to possible alternative rules.
The erroneous belief in the reality of abstract, absolute right
is due to the existence of rules whose operation can scarcely
result in wrong in any probable case; such are the moral rules
in the decalogue; and yet, it would not be difficult to suppose a
case in which the strict application of the injunction against
stealing would produce hardship. Related to this belief in
absolute right is the general belief that the conscience tells the
individual what is right and what is wrong; but this, too, is
erroneous. The conscience does not and cannot decide upon
the ethical aspect of an act; this can alone be done by the
reasoning powers; after these have given their judgment, then
the conscience approves or disapproves of action in accordance
therew th. The individual has no "moral sense" to tell him
directly whether an act is right or wrong; with regard to the
ethical character of some acts it requires long and careful con-
sideration to form an opinion, and this opinion may change with
a further accumulation of ideas. -In cases in which a decision
is instant and apparently spontaneous, analysis will reveal that
repeated decisions upon such points have simply produced a
fixed judgment, ready to be applied to like cases whenever they
arise.
Directing our attention to the reasoning processes of the
mind, we find them influenced by training and education, by
environing circumstances and conditions which define the
position of the individual in the society, and by the relation of
that society to others. This is clearly revealed in the compari-
son of ethical ideas found in different regions; in sofar as two
societies have developed under similar conditions, they will
present the same characteristics of thought; and in so far as
their development has been controlled by dissimilar conditions,
will they diverge. These conditions are not all physical and
industrial; they include every force influencing societal evolu-
tion, such as religion and philosophy, art and literature; all
elements in the society act and react, one upon the other, and
they -are affected by the interaction between their society
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and others. And throughout' all these forces, emphatically
indicating the direction of their operation, are found the
motives of societal welfare and individual happiness; the
moral coloring of an act depends upon its effects with refer-
ence to the society in which it occurs.* In barbarous and half-
civilized communities it is generally thought right and com-
mendable to lie and steal and murder, if done against the mem-
bers of some other group, the welfare of the one being inimical
to the other. The moral rules and the laws of the tribe are
applicable only to actions between its own members; all out-
siders are beyond their protection. Numberless exemplifica-
tions of this truth might be cited; even the early Israelites per-
ceived no moral turpi"tude in falsehoods or cruelty practiced
upon other tribes; particularly when their welfare as a people
was involved, any acts conducive thereto were considered
morally right and justifiable.
The lower the individual, the more egoistic are his ideas.
and feelings; to the primitive man, that is right which tends
to his own personal advantage; the society is quite beyond his
mental scope.t But the idea or feeling of a single individual.
cannot become a rule of action or a custom for the tribe; to
become such it must be shared by the mass of the trbe; and
if thus held, it matters not that each is inspired by egoistic
reasons, for in this case of generality it will be found that
action in accordance with such idea or feeling is beneficial to
the society as well as to the individual; as a rule, the advantage
of the mass of the society is quite identical with the welfare of
the society as such.
As the individual rises in the scale of civilization, his ethical
ideas and feelings will recognize more and more the interests of
* It is illustrative to notice that this is also true of acts due to false ideas
or beliefs, which have no valid and real basis in the societal welfare. Such
was the nature of the persecution of the early Christians in Rome, and, in sub-
sequent centuries, by one sect of Christians against other sects. The funda.
mental motive of such persecution has rarely been recognized. Blind hatred,
or religious "zeal, was not the ultimate cause; the welfare of the society
was believed to be involved; that welfare was thought to depend upon per-
sistence in established forms of worship, wrought into the political fabric of
the society, or upon the benignant attitude of a jealous God, who would afflict
the society as a whole for suffering heresy in its midst; so that. what was
heresy as to the ecclesiastical, became treason against the political organiza-
tion.
t A Bushman, being questioned by a missionary as to his moral ideas, is
said to have replied, that if someone were to steal his wife, that would be a
bad action, but if he himself were to steal the wife of another, that would be
good. (Waitz, Anthropologie, I, 376.)
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others, first his immediate relatives and friends, gradually ex-
tending until they comprehend the mass of the society, or the
society itself; while in advanced communities are found many
individuals who devote much time and energy, and even endure
public opprobrium, for the achievement of a reform which could
but slightly benefit themselves, but which they believe would
increase the welfare of the people as a whole.
A tribe, compelled to wander over considerable stretches to
seek subsistence, will naturally develop a custom of abandoning
or putting to death the aged, who seriously retard the move-
ments of the rest. This originates in necessity, and continues
until such necessity ceases. As the tribe gradually becomes
more settled, as the conditions of its existence are ameliorated,
the application of the custom becomes less frequent, and finally,
when the grazing stage is reached, the custom disappears and is
forgotten. In its inception it was justifiable on the ground of the
tribal welfare; the existence of the tribe demanded it; but as
conditions change, and as intelligence becomes more important
to the community, the old men are useful for their greater wis-
dom and experience; then the custom tends to lessen the mate-
rial welfare of the tribe as well as violate the promptings of nat-
ural affection in the individual; it becomes unjustifiable and
must pass away.
In a primitive society, where the organization is too feeble,
and not properly constructed to yield sufficient protection to
the person of the individual, the principle of retaliation is con-
ducive to the social welfare; the instinct of self-defence leads
to the development of a custom, and this may even become a
law. But as the political organization becomes stronger, and
personal safety increases, the reason for the rule is weakened;
it is antagonized by the consideration that retaliation decreases
the strength of the society to resist outside attacks; and it
yields to the rule of commutation, which satisfies the spirit of
revenge without weakening the society itself.
We may, then, consider rules of action as having their
source in ideas, feelings and tendencies, which are the product
of social conditions and forces; these ideas, etc., cannot be
changed by mere volition; they are not infallible; indeed, the
probability of error in the ideas of individuals is quite great,
decreasing according to the number sharing them; and when
they are held by the mass of a society, they form the basis for
rules of action, called custom or law.
The genesis of these rules in primitive societies is obscured
beyond the reach of historical research, but the general princi-
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ples, governing the manner of their origin, are derivable from
sociological investigation of social forces and conditions. As
to primary customs (such as are not derived by analogy from
others), there has doubtless been some antecedent physical or
material circumstance which made it convenient to perform or
avoid some act, or to perform it in a certain way; it may relate
to hygiene, to abstention from certain substances as food, or to
some industrial matter, or to family or social relations, indeed,
to any department of daily activity. Some natural reason pri-
marily leads to the performance of some act, the repetition and
imitation of which is assured by the persistence of the original
cause until a rule is developed, which passes insensibly into a
custom. This rule is handed down to those who never have
known its absence, and to whom it therefore appears natural.
In this transmission the underlying reasons of the rule are not
emphasized as is the rule itself; the important element is obedi-
ence to Cie rule-not a knowledge of its raison d'Atre. Moreover,
the real, natural reasons do not appeal to the immature minds
of youths, and the rule is far more effective if they are taught
that some supernatural being has ordained it, and that its diso-
bedience will result in some mysterious evil, rather than in
some ordinary harm or inconvenience. Thus the true raison
d''tre is soon lost, and is replaced by a divine or supernatural
source and sanction, whose accepted validity remains unmen-
aced by observation or speculation; for ideas of causality are
beyond the uncultured mind, which always seeks.for an agent,
and most easily seizes upon some personal, supernatural source
to explain a11 natural phenomena.
Thus custom develops and is explained, if at all, in a primi-
tive community; and custom is synonymous with morality,* for
every particular custom is morally right in the view of those
who practice it, and their chief idea of moral wrong is disobe-
dience to the custom. And in so far as a custom is actually
conducive to the welfare of the community, we must approve it
as right in a scientific sense. In the formative period of a pri-
mary custom it is quite certain to satisfy this test; but, as just
indicated, it quickly obtains a supernatural sanction, and
becomes absolute, having validity independent of the condi-
tions which brought it forth. Then there arises a possibility
of pernicious consequences along two main lines: (i.) Upon
* Mos (moris) in the singular always meant custom or manner; the plural,
mores, in addition to this original meaning by a natural process developed
the derivative meaning of morals or virtue.
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this false assumption of its intrinsic validity, other rules may
be derived from this custom by analogy or logical reasoning,
without regard to the conditions of the community, and, there-
fore, easily out of harmony therewith. (2.) The original cus-
tom, having this sanction independent of the conditions which
gave rise to it, may persist unchanged, while those conditions
alter so that the custom is no longer in harmony with the social
requirements, and does more harm than good. Generally, how-
ever, conditions will succeed in modifying the custom, or cause
it to be discarded. The principle of "the survival of the
fittest" applies in all its rigor to customs; and if a detrimental
custom is tenaciously adhered to, the group observing it, weak-
ened by its operation, will succumb to some other group, free
from its influence; and thus that custom will pass away with
the disappearance of its group as an independent community.
In the least developed communities all the rules of action
may be said to be customary; a legal rule, a law, is not yet dis-
coverable.* Before law can be said to exist there must be an
organization of the society, such that there is somewhere
located a definite power to take cognizance of the violation of
the acknowledged rules, and enforce obedience thereto by some
determinate method. Such organization is political, and the
authority that wields this political power may be called the
sovereign. Law, then, in the primitive community, is simply
the total of those particular customs which the sovereign
undertakes to enforce, or whose violation he undertakes to pre-
vent, by some determinate procedure.t
As to what customs will be thus adopted and transmuted
into law, nothing definite can be determined apriori; it depends
upon the nature of the custom, its importance, and whether
the 'force of public opinion can satisfactorily deal with its
infractions. Some early codes, as the Laws of Menu, take cog-
*In a certain aspect most of these general rules may be called religious,
because of the manner in which primitive religion embraces and assimilates
nearly all the intellectual activities of the individual.
t," Early law . . . begins by consecrating or affirming that which
already is." (Edith Simcox.)
The following passage from the Corpus Juris Civilis may be cited as
revealing how the intrinsic validity of custom was recognized even at the cul-
mination of the development of Roman Law: "Inveterata consuetudo pro
lege non immerito custoditur, et hoe est jus quod dicitur moribus constitutum.
Nam cum ipsae leges nulla alia ex causa nos teneant, quam quod judicio
populi receptae sunt. merito et ea, quae sine ullo scripto populus probavit,
tenebunt omnes: nam quid interest sujfragio populus voluntatem suam
declaret an rebus ipsis et factis ?" (Digest, I, 3, 32.) (Julian.)
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nizance of many minute details of ordinary daily life, whose
relation to the welfare of the society was very slight in fact,
but which were considered important for peculiar religious
reasons. And the degree to which Sunday laws are enacted
may be cited as revealing the measure of importance, as regards
the social welfare, attached to the observance of the Sabbath
at different periods and in different communities.
This transmutation of customs into laws in a primitive so-
ciety is not, however, by a legislative act of the sovereign; it is
effected by means of the judicial function. A dispute must
first arise, or some act must be committed, of which the sov-
ereign takes cognizance; and it is in the decision or judgment,
in which specific effect is given to some particular custom, that
the law is generated; thenceforth that decision becomes a legal
rule, having special force from the fact of its enunciation by
the sovereign. Simultaneous with the utterance of the rule,
the method of its enforcement is established.
Thus, beginning with ideas, feelings and tendencies that
result in actions beneficial to the society, we find that some of
these acts, by repetition, develop custom; and law is that part
of custom whidh the society, politically organized, undertakes
to enforce by settled methods, leaving the remainder to be
enforced indeterminately by the social force of public opinion,
assisted more or less by the religious influences.
However, this description will not apply to the laws as a
whole of any except the most primitive community. The de-
ciding of cases gives opportunity for a further development,
passing beyond the mere custom, and introducing an element
formed by the reasoning processes of the arbiter. And if a
case occurs in which there is no custom-a case influencing the
community so that the political organization will take cogni-
zance thereof-the arbiter must apply his ideas directly, thus
establishing a law without a precedent custom.
Meanwhile the idea of law as something more than custom,
and distinguishable from it, is being developed; and this distinc-
tion is accentuated when some ruler, or ruling body, promul-
gates a code; then the code itself is the law; the connection of
law with custom or morality is forgotten, and the source of law
is the individual or body promulgating the code. A divine
origin may be ascribed to it, but the minds of .the people can-
not penetrate beyond the self-constituted interpreters of the
divine will, and law can only be what these proclaim.
About this period we must recognize the development of
the intellectual processes to such a point that the ruling body,
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viewing laws as rules promulgated by itself, will form new rules
directly to achieve some desirable result in the society. Here
we have the first appearance of legislation, the function of
making rules to apply to future events; here there is no pre-
sumption of preexistent custom, as in the exercise of the
judicial function in declaring laws, nor do actual cases need to
arise antecedently. Laws produced by the legislative function
may, then, be defined as being such general rules, promulgated
by the political organization without necessary regard to past
events, but with special reference to the future, as the sover-
eign undertakes to enforce by determinate procedure. We say
general rules in order to distinguish between legislation and
administration; the rules declared by the legislative function
set forth the status of individuals, establishing their permanent,
natural relations to one another as members of the society, or
they are rules logically developed from such principles; they
ought all to be in direct dependence upon the principle of util-
ity, conducive to the welfare of the society. Rules, to have the
nature of laws, must be general; and, though rules are for-
mulated by the administrative function, these are merely
intended for the formal guidance of certain specific individ-
uals, who stand in contract relations to the state.
To laws derived from custom we must therefore add those
having their source directly in the minds "of the legislators;
and between the two extremes of laws wholly derived from
custom, and those developed by the reasoning processes
alone, there are all degrees of combination, where legislative
action is variously suggested by preexisting cusioms. More-
over, in so far as legislation is the effect of a correctly inter-
preted social need, it may, together with custom, be reduced to
a common source for all law; this source may be denominated
the social forces, understanding "social" in its widest significa-
tion as comprehending all the forces operating within or upon
the society-economic, political, religious, etc.
Where no obstacles are incurred, where the social organiza-
tion is loose, such forces will develop a custom; but as the
organization becomes more rigid, such a result is hindered. Nev-
ertheless, those forces continue to operate with the same
tendency, whatever maybe the stage of civilization, and they are
potent among us to-day. New inventions and discoveries tend
to develop new rules of action by effecting changes in the social
structure, and causing new relations of individuals towards
each other and with reference to material objects. This reality
is often concealed by the application of old rules to the new
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conditions, but even here the creative energy of the social forces
is evidenced by the alterations and adaptations wrought in those
rules. However, we may cite a modern instance, in which cus-
tomary rules grew up and subsequently were transmuted into
law by the judicial and legislative functions. The discovery of
gold in California brought men into new relations to each other
with regard to the auriferous soil-relations unknown to the
customs or laws already existing; new customs soon developed,
based chiefly upon experience as to what was advantageous to
the mining community; in some districts express regulations
were adopted. When the judicial and legislative departments of
the State were organized, these customs and rules were recog-
nized, adopted and enforced, thus becoming laws.* Reference
might also be here made to the rules and forms developed by
conveyancers and later recognized and approved by the courts,
finally being adopted by the legislature.
As civilization advances, as intellectual activity increases, the
legislative function, depending upon the reasoning processes,
correspondingly develops until, superficially, it seems to quite
exclude the formation of law by the judicial function; but the
latter continues its inconspicuous activity in adopting customs
and usages as the bases of its decisions, thus conferring upon
them the validity of law. The courts also create much law by
reasoning from primary and acknowledged principles, just as
geometrical rules, to fit intricate relations, are derived from
axioms. And throughout all this judicial activity may be per-
ceived the efficiency of the principle of utility, guiding the mind
in its reasoning, and testing the legal rules thus developed.
Since the moral aspect of an act or rule is dependent upon
the relation of the same to the society in which it occurs or oper-
ates, we must reject all belief in any specific, finite idea or
* In Morton v. The Solambo Copper Mining Co. (26 Cal. 532). Chief Justice
Sanderson said: "The six hundred and twenty-first section of the Practice
Act provides that: 'In actions respecting mining claims proof shall be
admitted of the customs, usages or regulations established and in force at the
bar or diggings embracing such claims; and such customs, usages or regula-
tions, when not in conflict with the Constitution and laws of this State, shall
govern the decision of the action.' At the time the foregoing became a part
of the law of the land there had sprung up throughout the mining regions of
the State, local customs and usages by which persons engaged in mining pur-
suits were governed in the acquisition, use, forfeiture or loss of mining ground.
. These usages and customs were the fruits of the times, and demanded
by the necesgities of communities who, though living under the common law,
could find therein no clear and well defined rules for their guidance applicable
to the new conditions by which they were surrounded."
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dogma being absolutely right; and, as a corollary, we must
also reject all belief in any human laws as being intrinsically
right-right at all times, under all conditions, in all societies.
However, there are certain general conditions of existence true
of all parts of the eaith, and applying to all societies, and there-
fore we find certain customs or laws common to all. Such was
the content, in a more restricted sphere, of the jus gentium* of
the Romans, which, under the influence of the Greek philosophy,
was transformed into a system of natural law--the law of nature.
The error was in believing that these general rules-ipplied
to man merely by reason of his nature as a human'being,
independent of his surroundings; it remained for the present
century to fully recognize the interaction among men, and be-
tween man and his environment, and that these general rules
were really the product thereof. The most fundamental rules
in Roman jurisprudence, in the common law or equity of Eng-
land, or in modern internationial law, go no deeper than this;
and the same is equally true of all the dogmas and principles
enunciated in documents of a constitutional nature, in so far as
such enunciations are rules of action, and not mere philosophi-
cal propositions. There is no natural law, and hence no" natural
rights," in an absolute sense-apart from a society and its in-
terests. Overwhelming difficulties beset every practical appli-
cation of a specific principle drawn from the law of nature. Its
only real basis is the longing of the human mind for a state of
existence free from the experienced ills of life-a longing which
has also given rise tp Utopian social systems, as well as fanciful
ideas concerning the existence hereafter. The want of a firm
basis for this law of nature is revealed in the incongruity of its
different parts, never fully recognized until brought forth in
an attempt at practical application. And the attempted literal
adherence to such a system, if persisted in, must logically lead
to such vagaries as the French Revolution produced.
Tylor says: "The tribe makes its law, not on an abstract
principle that manslaughter is right or wrong, but for its own
preservation." t And the same force remains behind that law
and gives it validity throughout its continuance; personal safety
is necessary to societal welfare. A lessening of proprietary
security is also detrimental to the society; property is necessary
for existence, and the same instinct of self-preservation is the
*"Jus autem gentium omni humano generi commune est; nam usu
exigente et humanis necessitatibus gentes humanae quaedam sibi consti-
tuerunt." Justinian, Inst. i. 2, 2.
f Anthropology, page 42.
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antecedent of the first ideas of ownership, ltading to laws
against all species of theft. In these instances the law seems
to recognize only the individual, but the fundamental force or
motive is the welfare of the society; its solicitude for the indi-
vidual extends only so far as his welfare is necessary to its
own. The interests of the society may be traced throughout
the laws governing ownership, use and transfer of property.
On grounds of public policy private ownership or use of certain
kinds of property has been, in various societies, required of or
prohibited to either certain classes, or the .people as a whole.
Socialists and communists justify all their arguments concerning
proprietary rights ultimately on the welfare of the society; and
the same theoretical basis has borne a weight of varied
sumptuary laws-erroneous reasoning and pernicious enact-
ments, but nevertheless illustrating the controlling motive.
The modifying influence of social conditions upon moral-
ity, and the laws thereon based, is emphatically revealed in the
history of usury laws and of the term "usury." When indus-
trial conditions were such that opportunities to invest money, so
as to derive a large profit, were rare, when borrowing was not
for investmefit, but for necessaries, luxuries, taxes-for some
purpose, in attaining which the amount borrowed was so con-
sumed that it did not directly assist in earning the money to be
repaid-then any interest was usury and was stringently for-
bidden both by the legal and the moral code. But as industry
developed and opportunities for remunerative investment in-
creased, the law gradually yielded so as to permit interest and
"usury" came to mean merely such a rate as was considered
beyond the productiveness of ordinary enterprises.
It has appeared that all human rules of action, and therefore
all laws, are productive of both good and evil, and that a speci-
fic rule is right or wrong according as the good or the evil
effects are in excess. Then arises the question as to the actual
approximation of laws to the ethical standard. This cannot be
answered a priori; the theoretical relation between right and
law tells more accurately what the law ought to be, than what
it is; the latter problem is a matter for examination of actual
facts; it is empiric, not scientific, in its nature. Nevertheless
the theory supplies the test: taking a specific law, does it in-
crease or decrease the welfare of the society and the happiness
of its members?
Considering the source of laws, it is evident that those
derived from customs are most likely to satisfy this test,
because they are more directly the product of social conditions
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than laws created by legislation. All laws, however, are at a
certain disadvantage as compared with customs; for the ethical
character of a rule depends upon its effect; its effect largely
depends upon its flexibility to fit cases superficially alike, but
actually more or less dissimilar; and a law, being more rigid
than a custom, will operate less accurately. Most rules, though
operating beneficially in the greater number of instances, will
do harm in particular peculiar cases; and yet, perhaps, no
exception is allowed; it is feared that an exception would
destroy the efficacy of the rule-that some individuals would
ignorantly or wilfully act upon the exception where the strict
rule ought to be applied; and therefore it is believed that less
harm, and consequently more good, will result from a rigid
enforcement of the rule than from permitting exceptions other-
wise proper and just. Thus, some cases of theft, under stress
of great physical necessity, ought on principle to be excused;
but if this were done, it is probable that they would be followed
by many cases where there would be in fact no such justifica-
tion, the culprit trusting to ingenuity to make it thus appear.
As above suggested, laws established by the legislative func-
tion are more apt than those derived from custom to be out of
harmony with social conditions, because not generated directly
by the social forces. Many pernicious laws are conscientiously
enacted by reason of the imperfection of the human intellect
in perceiving the true nature of social relations, and in discov-
ering the appropriate remedy for real ills. No form of govern-
ment can eliminate this fault; it can only be reduced in
proportion as the knowledge and wisdom of the legislative body
increase. On the other hand, assuming a high degree of intel-
lectual power in that body, there remains danger of unjust
enactments, and from two chief sources: prejudice between
classes, and ignorance of the real needs of the people; in a
democracy the legislature would seem to be exposed quite
exclusively to the former evil, while an oligarchical body would
be liable to both.
Laws, however, may be just and beneficial in their itiception,
but later, by changes in the social conditions, become injurious
and unjust. Such changes are necessary events in organic
existence. Customs, not being reduced to precise words, can
gradually yield and constantly reapproach an accord with the
conditions in which they operate; but laws, being expressed in
certain forms, and having a force independent of the conditions
that brought them forth, will remain rigid, and pass into some
degree of disaccord with the needs of the society. Then arises
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the problem of a readjustment, of bringing the laws again into
harmony with the conditions as changed.
Of the methods in which this is accomplished, the crudest
and most primitive is that of fictions. These have been fully
exemplified in the jus civile of Rome, and the common law of
England. These respective systems of law originated in cus-
tom; at the time the separate rules composing them were
adopted, these rules were beneficial to the society, and were
right; but as they persisted unaltered from century to century,
while the society progressed, many of them, when literally
applied, resulted in wrong. This was felt; but in the early
stages of civilization the fear of changing the law is great,
stability is of the highest importance, and the very letter of
the law is venerated; this was emphatically illustrated among
the Romans, whose law was embodied in the Twelve Tables.
Therefore a direct change of the law was not feasible; but
instead, when a case occurred in which the strict rule would
fail to do justice, the Roman prudentes by their responsa and the
English judges in their decisions, though leaving the letter of
the rule untouched, so modified its operation as to change it in
fact; and the fact of such change was thenceforth recognized
and acted upon. This change was always to attain justice, to
bring the operation of the rule into harmony with the altered
conditions of the society-to make it right.
However, fictions are more adapted to stages when adher-
ence to form, and respect for what is established, are of first
importance; a more cultured age will experience repugnance to
the pretense involved. Moreover, the crude nature of fictions
does not permit them to do the most accurate justice; to which
may be added that their application, in the first instance, could
not be demanded as of right, and there would be a natural hesi-
tancy to adopt them. When society then advances so that
avowed alterations in the law are practicable, a new instrument
gradually appears to modify the laws which are no longer in
harmony with the social conditions, and make them conform
with right. This instrument is equity, and is a most prominent
feature in both the Roman and the English jurisprudence. In
England the judges of the common law courts, bound by prece-
dent and venerating the letter and form of the law, would not,
and perhaps, considering their training, could not directly
modify the law to suit the circumstances of particular cases; this
duty devolved upon the Chancellor, who "gave a remedy"
where the common law provided none. Under the peculiar
judicial organization in Rome, the Praetor, though enforcing
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the jus ivilt, was able, largely by his edict, to develop a
system of equity which modified that law. Both the Chancellor
and the Praetor, as a basis for their innovations, assumed a set
of principles of a higher validity .than the old rules of law; in
England they were referred to the conscience of the' King in
theory; but in reality the Chancellor as well as the Praetor had
recourse to his own sense of justice and right; and this sense,
influenced by the social conditions of the times, may be reduced
to an opinion of what the common welfare demanded. Thus
equity was simply a return to the original source of law-to
custom, and to the forces that generate custom-whence a new
rule was derived to modify or overrule the existing law, bring-
ing the law as a whole more nearly into harmony with the prin-
ciple of utility.
These methods of modification apply chiefly to law devel-
oped by lawyers and courts through cases-real cases in Eng-
lish law, but real or assumed -in Roman. At present civiliza-
tion and intelligence have advanced among us to such a stage
that courts have passed quite beyond all use of fictions, and
equity is being assimilated into the legal system so as to lose
its distinctive form and attributes; it has already finished its-
work, for there is now no hesitancy in directly changing "case-
law" where the society would be clearly benefited thereby.
However, the laws created by legislation are rarely changed
by the judiciary; courts construe such laws and determine their
application, but, actually as well as theoretically, their purpose
is merely to discover the real intention of the legislature, and,
perhaps, to supply a harmonious intention in cases not foreseen.
The legislative function itself must then be relied on to change
its own laws; and indeed, legislation is the most general and
effective, as well as the most modern, method of changing any
and all laws, whatever their source. It has no need of fictions,
or theories of higher principles; it 'need not even avowedly
refer to the welfare of the society. In theory, at least, it can
repeal as well as create at will; and legislative bodies are chiefly
occupied in modifying the legal system by the alteration or
repeal of old laws and the enactment of new ones.
In general, if there is a divergence between right and law,
however it may occur, and in whatever part of the law, the
latter must change and harmonize with the principle of utility.
If the law-making and law-enforcing functions persist in the
retention and -application of an unjust and pernicious law, if
sufficient in importance there will develop an organized move-
ment among the people towards its correction. In extreme
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cases such movement will be termed a rebellion, and, if success-
ful, history will call it a revolution. The government may jus-
tify the objectionable law by arguments derived from prece-
dent, or it may be based on some fundamental political
dogma; then its opponents, unable to assail it on any definite,
acknowledged legal principle, will resort to the indefinite basis
of the law of nature, arguing their claim as a natural right.
They seek for some law of a higher authority than the law they
strive to overthrow. The principle of utility is unknown and
unrecognized, though its operation is absolutely fundamental
in the movement, and its test decisive upon the final outcome,
though it is hidden beneath the form of the law of nature and
the doctrine of natural rights-the mere creation of the human
mind. Figuratively we may characterize the law of nature as
a structure built under the socially-desired object to give it an
apparent basis more impressive than the real one, the principle
of utility. The real strength of the agitator for a natural
right lies in his arguments to prove it beneficial to the society.
It thus appears that the relation between right and law is
essentially such that most law in its creation, and all law for its
continued existence, is conditioned upon a real accord with the
moral standard of the society; though there is a constant ten-
dency for law to diverge from right, because law is necessarily
stable, while social conditions are inevitably changeable, yet
there is also a concurrent and controlling tendency for law to
reapproach and harmonize with right.
In closing we wish to impress the central truth involved,
the welfare of the society and the happiness of its members as
the basis upon which all right, and all law in so far as it is
right, have always stood, and must ever stand. Salus populi
suprenia est lex. Further, it seems only desirable to recognize
that morality and law are only particular products of a far
more extensive creative power, that has also generated all the
multifarious institutions of the highest civilization, religious
and political, domestic and industrial, embracing all the varied
relations of man to man; this creative power we have called
the social forces; and we desire to emphasize the reality and
the efficacy of these as deep-coursing, natural forces, operating
in society with absolute accuracy in harmony with principles
that are universal-and divine; for we would not disturb the
faith in law as founded on the eternal Will of God; we would
only call attention to its real, immediate connection with the
conditions of mundane existence, its adaptibility to the nature
and to the needs of man, the truth that it is the product of social
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forces. This is its scientific basis, and here we must stop; that
which lies beyond is the "category of the unknowable," the realm
of philosophy, speculation and faith,-a realm no less real than
the one in which we labor, but beyond the reach of scientific
methods of investigation and proof. Yet, humbly pursuing the
enlightened interests of the human race, doing our best for the
welfare of human society in its struggle towards a better and
nobler existence, we may rest confident that there is no great
divergence between human law and the universal Law of God.
SAMUEL PETERSON.
